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This study determines the entry and exit thresholds of table grape farming with 
irreversible investment under uncertainty.  Real option approach is adopted to consider the 
investment and management flexibility.  Also revenue insurance is introduced to consider the 
effect of the risk management programs on the entry and exit thresholds.  Results show that 
revenue insurance increases the entry and exit thresholds by 1% and 4%, respectively, thus 
discouraging new investment and current farming, as long as the revenue guarantee is less than 
the exit threshold.  Revenue insurance increases the entry threshold by 3% and decreases the exit 
threshold by 13% as long as the revenue guarantee is greater than the exit threshold.  In this case, 
revenue insurance discourages the investment and encourages the current farmer to stay in 
farming, further.  However, the decrease in the subsidy rate results in the increase in both entry 
and exit thresholds.  Thus, the premium subsidy levels should be carefully considered if the 
policy objective is to encourage growers to shift to higher-value crops. 
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  2Introduction 
Grapes are a high value crop that constitutes the largest perennial crop in the U.S., 
with bearing acreage increasing from almost 700,000 acres in 1980 to almost 950,000 
acres in 2000 (Fruit and Tree Yearbook).  Currently, California accounts for 90% of 
domestic production.  However, table grapes can potentially be grown in several regions 
of the U.S.  For example, initial field trials have demonstrated that table grapes can 
effectively be grown in some regions of Texas (Stein and McEachern).  However, though 
table grapes can technically be grown, the timing and size of future cash flows are key 
factors that farmers consider when deciding whether to invest in establishing a table 
grape vineyard.   
Passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000 greatly expanded 
the availability of crop insurance for farmers.  Not only have premium subsidies 
increased, but also the types of policies available and the crops that can be insured.  As a 
result, when evaluating whether to invest in establishing a vineyard, the risk averse 
farmer should also include crop insurance in the analysis because crop insurance changes 
the revenue distribution, and consequently, affect the riskiness of future cash flows.  
Currently, a variety of policies are available that provide insurance coverage for farmers 
growing grapes.  For example, grower yield certification (GYC) and GYC-Span are 
policies available in various states that provide yield insurance for grape growers, while 
adjusted gross revenue (AGR) and the recently developed AGR-Lite provide revenue 
insurance for grape growers in several states.  These or similar policies are also available 
for farmers growing other perennial crops.  Furthermore, the geographic availability of 
these and similar policies is likely to continue to expand as a result of the ARPA mandate.  
  1Given these policy developments, it seems important to incorporate crop insurance into 
the economic analysis of the farmer’s investment decision when evaluating perennial 
crops such as grapes. 
Traditionally, the net present value (NPV) has been widely adopted as a capital 
budgeting method to identify valuable investments.  However, the NPV approach has 
been criticized because it only considers the current decision, not the management 
flexibility to invest at later date (Myers).  By waiting, the investor or manager may gather 
more valuable information and thus stand a better position for decision-making.   
As an alternative to NPV, the concept of real options has been used to overcome the 
shortcomings of traditional NPV (Trigeorgis).  The real option approach applies the 
financial option concept to the investment in real assets when the decision is made under 
uncertainty (Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck).  The approach accounts for the 
opportunity to exercise an option to undertake the investment over a given period of time.  
For example, if two periods are exclusively available for the investment, the investor can 
make a decision now or next year.  If the investor waits until next year, he invests only 
when the uncertainty has been resolved and the market condition is favorable.  Otherwise 
the investor chooses not to invest, avoiding the bad outcome and limiting losses. Like 
financial options, a potential investor has the right, but not the obligation, to sell or buy 
the underlying assets at a pre-specified price for a given period.  Waiting or flexibility in 
timing the investment may eliminate the unfavorable situation, thus producing higher 
project value from the investment.  While traditional NPV allows only now or never 
decisions in investment, the real option approach provides more flexibility and valuable 
information in investment (or disinvestments) and management decision-making.  We 
  2adopt a real option approach as the theoretical decision criterion for the investment in a 
vineyard.  We consider an industry-level perspective in order to draw policy-relevant 
conclusions about crop insurance programs and their potential impact on investment in 
agriculture.   
In a competitive industry, the value of the option to wait for any one farm is 
affected by the fact that many farmers enter the industry whenever its value is positive 
(Leahy).  Given an inverse demand function with negative slope, new entrants constitute 
an increase in supply, resulting in lower market price and thus decreased marginal benefit 
from investment.   
Many previous studies have utilized entry and exit models.  Brennan and 
Schwartz introduced the entry and exit model with several management strategies.  Dixit 
(1989) showed only the entry and exit decision model and provided some analytical 
results.  Leahy showed that the entry and exit model resulted in the same thresholds for 
both the myopic firm and competitive equilibrium.  Dixit and Pindyck provided the entry 
and exit model with both a single firm having monopoly to invest and competitive 
equilibrium in their textbook.  Dixit (1991) developed irreversible investment model 
under demand uncertainty with price ceiling in a competitive industry and Dixit and 
Pindyck provided the entry and exit model with price ceiling and price floor in a 
competitive industry.  All these studies found that options on investment timing are 
different in an industry perspective compared with an individual investor, and confirmed 
the importance of taking uncertainty into account in investment modeling.   
Recent real option studies in the agricultural economics literature include the 
entry-exit decision (Price and Wetzstein; Isik et al), the replacement decision of 
  3equipment (Hyde, Stokes, and Engel), the sequential investment decision in crop 
management (Isik, Khanna, and Winter-Nelson), and technology adoption (Purvis et al).  
Also Salin studied the impact of food safety risks on capital investment.  However, no 
studies consider the risk management strategy, especially crop insurance, in the 
investment decision.   
This paper determines the investment (entry) and disinvestments (exit) thresholds 
for table grape farming using a real option approach when crop insurance is available to 
the risk-averse farmer in California.  By calculating the entry and exit threshold with crop 
insurance and without crop insurance, we determine the effect of crop insurance on 
investment decisions in table grape farming.  This study makes a contribution in that it 





We analyze the entry and exit model under the assumption of a competitive 
industry.  An investment or capital budgeting is a long-term and strategic decision in 
farm level.  In a long-term perspective, many farmers can join or leave grape farming 
according to market conditions.  They act competitively so that abnormal project value 
disappears.  That is, in a competitive industry, positive project value induces more 
inactive farmers and negative project value leads to the active operator leaving the 
business, resulting in dynamic equilibrium in the long run.  Thus, when making 
investment decision, the farmer needs to consider the potential entrance of competitive 
  4farmers.  We assume many grape farmers who are price takers so that each farm’s 
investment decision doesn’t affect market price.  We also assume homogeneous products 
to eliminate price differentiation for the analysis.   
Uncertainty in the competitive industry could be farm specific and industry-wide 
(or aggregate uncertainty), where the former can be explained by the uncertainty of 
management skill (or technology) and commodity specific demand and the latter can be 
explained by aggregate demand uncertainty or a widespread disaster in production.  In 
this paper, we assume industry-wide uncertainty because most of the uncertainties in 
agriculture are caused by market conditions or production dependency on nature.  In a 
competitive industry, price is an endogenous variable determined by the demand and 
production relationships, where both are assumed to be uncertain in this study.  Because 
price is a decreasing function of demand in aggregate level, demand uncertainty results in 
price that moves stochastically.  Yield also changes stochastically because of production 
uncertainty.  Yield and price are correlated, which is included in the specification of price 
and yield stochastic processes in the next section. 
In the model, the investment costs are assumed to be partially reversible, which 
results in salvage values.  On the other hand, the exit from the farming entails the costs, 
such as the elimination cost of trees or restoring cost of the land.  In this study, we 
assume that the exit costs totally counteract the salvage values so that both factors cane 
be eliminated in the model.  Once the farmer gets out of farming, he should spend same 
amount of investment costs to enter the farming again.  The variable cost is assumed to 
be relatively constant and thus the risk free rate must be used to discount it. 
  5To solve the model, we can use dynamic programming approach or contingent 
claim analysis that lead to the same solutions (Dixit and Pindyck).  However, the latter 
requires an assumption that uncertainty of an asset be replicated by spanning existing 
assets so that the risk free rate can be used.  Otherwise, dynamic programming approach 
can be used to maximize the present value of cash flow.  This approach requires the 
assumption of risk preferences or discount rates.  In this study, we follow the dynamic 
programming approach because the agricultural uncertainty cannot be easily spanned.  
Thus, we use the risk-adjusted discount rate to discount uncertain revenue flow. 
 
Entry and Exit Model with No Revenue Insurance 
To obtain the stochastic evolution of the value of project over time that affects the 
investment decision, we need stochastic processes of relevant variables.  We assume 
price and yield are stochastic variables that follow geometric Brownian motion
1 (Turvey; 
Price and Wetzstein).  When price and yield follow geometric Brownian motions, 
revenue also follows a geometric Brownian motion:  
 (1) dR  =  αRRdt + σRRdZR,  
where α is the drift parameter, σ is the volatility parameter, dt is a small time increment, 
and dZ is the increment of the standard Brownian motion (or Wiener process).     
Given the stochastic process of equation (1), the option value of an inactive farm 
that has the opportunity to enter farming, and the value of an active farm that has the 
option to leave the industry are determined simultaneously.  In a competitive industry, the 
entry and exit thresholds play roles as the upper and lower reflecting barriers that are the 
                                                 
1 The origins of Brownian motion processes are in physics, specifically the characteristics of a heavy 
particle being bombarded by lighter particles (Salin). 
  6equilibrium revenues for inactive farmers and active farmers, respectively (Leahy).  Dixit 
and Pindyck provided the simultaneous equations for the solution of thresholds with price 
uncertainty under dynamic equilibrium in a competitive industry.  With some 
mathematical derivations, the simultaneous equations are given as 
(2) 
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where βi are the roots of the fundamental quadratic equation, which will be obtained 
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β is the value of the option to exit.  C is the variable cost, I is the investment cost, r is 
the risk free rate of return, and δ is the rate of return shortfall that is the risk-adjusted rate 
of return ρ adjusted by the drift rate α, such as δ  = ρ - α.  δ  is commonly assumed to be 
greater than zero (ρ > α) otherwise no optimum exists and waiting is the best decision.   
Equation (2) and equation (4) are value-matching conditions that require the value of 
waiting to equal the value of investing (or abandoning) at the entry (or exit) threshold.  
Equation (3) and equation (5) are smooth-pasting conditions that require the same slopes 
of the value of waiting and the value of investing (or abandoning) at each threshold level.  
  7The last two terms of equation (2) and equation (4) denote the expected net present 
values of an infinite annuity of profit evaluated with the entry and exit threshold levels in 
case of no upper (lower) reflecting barriers, where revenue flow is discounted by the rate 
of return shortfall and constant cost is discounted by risk free rate.  By setting (B1-A1) and 
(B2-A2) as K1 and K2, we can solve the simultaneous equation with four unknowns, K1, K2, 
RH, and RL.  These equations are highly non-linear in the thresholds, RH and RL, thus the 
solution to the equations requires a numerical procedure.  In the model, optimal entry and 
exit thresholds are equilibrium revenue levels with upper and lower reflecting barriers, 
respectively, which result in zero option value of waiting (A1=A2=0).   
The entry and exit thresholds with the real options are compared with those with 
the NPV approach.  The entry threshold with the NPV approach is determined by the 
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Entry and Exit Model with Revenue Insurance 
Revenue insurance guarantees revenue floor (R ) by requiring a constant premium 
and thus increasing a variable cost.  Given the revenue flow R, if the revenue guarantee 
(or revenue floor) R  is less than the exit threshold RL, then the revenue insurance doesn’t 
affect the entry and exit thresholds because, when the revenue is less than the exit 
threshold, the farmer gets out of the farming.  If the revenue guarantee is binding, that is, 
if it is greater than the exit threshold, then revenue insurance affects the exit decision as 
well as the entry decision.  Revenue guarantee induces more inactive farmers to invest 
and more active farmers to stay in farming, resulting in the increase in the supply and 
  8thus the decrease in both the entry and exit thresholds.  On the other hand, revenue 
insurance requires that an active producer pay the insurance premium, which reduces the 
net revenue flow and decreases the attractiveness of entry, so that we need to consider the 
trade off between the revenue guarantee and insurance premium.   
The model can be separated into two cases.  The first case is when the revenue 
guarantee is greater than the exit threshold but less than the variable cost, ( L R RC
r
δ
≤≤ ).  
The second case is when the revenue guarantee is greater than the variable cost but less 
than the long run average cost ( CR C I
rr
δ δ
δ ≤ ≤+ ).  In this study, we focus on the first 
case because it is rare for the revenue guarantee from crop insurance to exceed the 
variable cost.  However, even though the guaranteed level is less then the variable cost, 
two cases must be considered.  The first case is when the revenue is greater than the exit 
threshold but less than the revenue guarantee,  L R RR ≤ ≤ .  The second case is when the 
revenue is greater than the revenue guarantee but less than the variable cost, R RC
r
δ
≤≤ .   
Let’s consider the first case,  L R RR ≤ ≤ .  If the revenue is greater than the exit 
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where π is the insurance premium, which may include a subsidy from the government,  
and A1 and A2 are the constants to be determined.  The first two terms in equation (6) are 
the expected present value of an infinite annuity of profit with revenue insurance, where 
the revenue has the lower boundary caused by insurance indemnity payment and thus 
  9discounted by the risk free rate.  The other two terms are the values adjusted by the upper 
reflecting barrier and the value of the option to exit given revenue guarantee.   
Additionally we have the value matching condition V(RL)=0 and smooth-pasting 
condition V’(RL)=0 that were explained earlier.  This value matching condition is 
obtained by setting the option value of waiting to be zero in a competitive market.  
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where B1 and B2 are the constants to be determined.  In equation (7), the expected present 
value of an annuity of revenue is discounted by the rate of return shortfall, where the 
revenue is not bounded from the floor, but the cost is discounted by risk free rate.  The 
other two terms are the values adjusted by upper reflecting barrier and the value of the 
option to exit given revenue guarantee.  The value matching and smooth-pasting 
conditions are V(RH) = I and V’(RH) = 0, respectively.  Assuming the value function V(R) 
is continuously differentiable around R , we get the following equations by equating two 
equations (6) and (7), and differentiating it.   
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Additionally, from the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we have four more 
equations to solve. 
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Now we have six simultaneous equations from (8) to (13) and six unknowns that include 
four constants, A1, A2, B1, and B2, and two thresholds, RH and RL.  These equations also 
are highly non-linear in the thresholds, RH and RL, thus the solution to the equations 
requires a numerical procedure.   
 
Data 
Data without Revenue Insurance 
California data on table grapes are used to calculate the parameters needed, where 
the price and yield series are statewide, provided by California Agricultural Statistics 
Service.  The trend and variance of yield and price series are calculated from the 
logarithm of the data (table 1).  Both the yield and price show positive trends, 0.003 and 
0.033, respectively.  The yield variance is 0.02 and the price variance is 0.04.  The 
correlation between the yield and price is –0.58.  The drift rate (trend) and volatility rate 
of revenue are 0.02 and 0.167, where the trend is adjusted from 0.049 because it is too 
high to last for infinity in a competitive market.  Instead, we do sensitivity analysis. 
The economic life of a table grape vineyard is twenty-five years and grape 
harvesting begins in the fourth year.  However, the farming operation is an ongoing 
  11business, thus following the subsequent farming operation at the end of the economic life.  
This leads to an infinite horizon model (Price and Wetzstein).  The investment cost 
includes the initial investment cost and three years of operating cost for vineyard 
establishment.  Initial investment cost is $11,921 per acre and the first three years of 
operating cost is $6,717 per acre, thus making the total investment cost $18,638 per acre 
(University of California-Cooperative Extension).  The operating cost is $5,559 per acre, 
per year.   
The risk-adjusted rate is assumed as 0.08 and the risk free rate is assumed as 0.07, 
comparable to Price and Wetzstein and Isik.  Then the rate of return shortfall defined by 
the difference between the risk-adjusted rate and the drift rate of revenue is 0.06.  The 
positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation, β1, is 2.186 and the negative root of 
fundamental quadratic equation, β2, is –2.614.   
 
Data with Revenue Insurance 
Until now, only yield insurance is available for table grapes in California.  
However, adjusted gross revenue (AGR) and the recently developed AGR-Lite provide 
revenue insurance for grape growers in several states.  As mentioned, passage of the 
ARPA in 2000 greatly expanded the regions and the types of policies and crops available 
so that the introduction of revenue insurance is highly possible.  Thus, we examine the 
effect of revenue insurance to consider the potential effect of implementing a new 
program in table grape in California.    
Revenue insurance provides a revenue coverage level ranging from 50% to 75% 
by 5% increments of expected revenue, and a producer premium rate ranging from 33% 
  12to 45% of the expected indemnity, respectively.  For each coverage level, a price election 
factor ranges from 50% to 100%.  60% and 75% coverage levels of approved revenue 
with price election factor of 100% are chosen for the study, resulting in the producer 
premium rate of 36% and 45%, respectively (table 1).  Thompson seedless grape in San 
Joaquin of California in 2002 is used to calculate the producer premium.  The expected 
revenue is $7,000, thus the guaranteed revenues with coverage levels of 60% and 75% 
are $4,200 and $5,250, respectively (California Cooperative Extension).  The base 
premium rates are assumed 6.3% for 65% coverage level and 9.4% for 75% coverage 
level based on GYC insurance, resulting in the premium of $95 and $222, respectively 
(USDA-RMA).  New operating costs are $5,654 for 60% coverage level and $5,781 for 
75% coverage level (table 1).  
 
Result 
The entry and exit thresholds of the NPV based on the Marshallian long run 
average cost and average variable cost are $5,883 and $4,765, respectively (table 2).  
Given the parameters, the simultaneous equations from equation (2) to equation (5) 
produce the entry and exit thresholds with the real option, where the entry threshold is 
$10,390 and the exit threshold is $4,371.  Compared with the values of traditional NPV, 
the entry threshold with real option approach is higher than that of the traditional NPV 
and the exit threshold with real option is lower than that of the traditional NPV, and these 
results support the literature in finding a significant effect of accounting for uncertainty in 
the investment decision.  The revenue that would stimulate entry is almost double the 
trigger level of revenue under traditional NPV analysis.  The effect of real options on exit 
  13is not nearly as dramatic, largely because in this framework it has been assumed that 
there is no sunk cost associated with exit. 
As the variable cost increases, both the entry and exit thresholds increase.  
According to the increase in variable cost from $5,559 to $6,059, the entry threshold 
increases from $10,390 to $11,100 and the exit threshold increases from $4,371 to $4,804.  
Thus the higher the variable cost, the less the investment in table grape farming and the 
faster the exit from table grape farming.  
As the investment cost increases, the entry threshold increases but the exit 
threshold decreases.  The entry threshold is $10,640 and the exit threshold is $4,328 
when the investment cost increases from $18,683 to $20,683.  It widens the inaction gap 
defined as the difference between the entry threshold and the exit threshold, thus inducing 
less investment and less departure from farming operation.   
As the risk-adjusted rate of interest increases, both the entry and exit thresholds 
increase.  When the risk-adjusted rate increases from 0.08 to 0.09, the entry threshold 
increases from $10,390 to $11,550 and the exit threshold increases from $4,371 to $5,010.  
Thus the increase in the risk-adjusted rate induces less investment of the inactive farmer 
and more active producers leaving from table grape farming.  This is because the higher 
discount factor decreases the expected present value of revenue.  
Also, as the drift rate increases, both the entry and exit thresholds decrease.  
When the drift rate of revenue increases from 0.02 to 0.03, the entry threshold decreases 
from $10,390 to $10,140 and the exit threshold decreases from $4,371 to $4,221.  Thus 
the higher the drift rate, the higher the investment in table grape farming and the slower 
the exit from table grape farming.  When the future expectation is good enough, the 
  14farmer would tend to stay in farming and it requires a low observed revenue to trigger 
exit. 
As the volatility increases, the entry threshold increases and the exit threshold 
decreases.  When it increases from 0.167 to 0.219, the entry threshold increases from 
$10,390 to $10,890 and the exit threshold decreases from $4,371 to $4,241.  This 
confirms the usual result that uncertainty increases the option value for waiting.  It 
widens the inaction gap, thus inducing less investment and less leaving in table grape 
farming.   
 
The effect of revenue insurance on the entry and exit threshold 
Revenue insurance increases the variable cost, and depending on the premium 
relative to risk reduction, increases both the entry and exit thresholds.  It discourages the 
investment and farming operation for the inactive and active farmer, respectively.  On the 
other hand, revenue insurance guarantees a minimum level of revenue and thus decreases 
both the entry and exit thresholds through the dampening of volatility on the stochastic 
process of revenue.  This risk-reduction effect tends to encourage both the investment and 
continuation of farming operation.  The net effect of revenue insurance on the entry and 
exit thresholds depends on the exit threshold and the relative magnitude of the indemnity 
and insurance premium. 
The entry and exit thresholds with 60% coverage level are $10,520 and $4,536, 
respectively, due to the increased variable costs (table 3).  However, the revenue 
guarantee of $4,200 is less than the exit threshold, $4,536, thus there is no effect on the 
entry and exit thresholds.  Revenue insurance with 60% coverage level increases the 
  15entry threshold by 1% and the exit threshold by 4%, resulting in the discouragement of 
the investment and current farming operation. 
The entry and exit thresholds with 75% coverage level are $10,710 and $4,563, 
respectively, when the increased insurance premium is added in variable cost.  However, 
the revenue guarantee of $5,250 is greater than the exit threshold, $4,563, thus affecting 
both the entry and exit thresholds.  Thus new entry and exit thresholds with 75% 
coverage level are $10,660 and $3,813, respectively.  Revenue insurance with 75% 
coverage level increases the entry threshold by 3% and decreases the exit threshold by 
13%, resulting in the discouragement of the investment and the encouragement of the 
current farming operation. 
Results show that the entry threshold with revenue insurance is higher than with 
no revenue insurance and the trigger level for entry increases according to the insurance 
coverage level.  So revenue insurance discourages the initial investment decision.  And 
also the higher the insurance coverage level, the higher the discouragement in investment 
decision regardless of the relationship between revenue guarantee and the exit threshold.  
This result explains that cost effect dominates revenue effect when the farmer makes an 
investment decision with crop insurance given investment flexibility.  An implication of 
this finding is that premium subsidy levels should be carefully considered if the policy 
objective is to encourage growers to shift to higher-value crops that may have more risky 
future returns than the major program crops. 
60% coverage level produces the higher exit threshold and 75% coverage level 
produces the lower exit threshold compared with no revenue insurance, respectively.  The 
big difference of these two coverage levels basically results from the revenue guarantee, 
  16where 60% coverage level has the lower revenue guarantee and 75% coverage level has 
the higher revenue guarantee than the exit threshold without revenue insurance.  As long 
as the revenue guarantee is less than the exit threshold, the revenue insurance only 
increases the variable cost, thus increasing the exit threshold.  It discourages the active 
farmer to stay in farming.  However, revenue effect dominates the cost effect provided 
the revenue guarantee is greater than the exit threshold, thus encouraging the current 
farmer to stay in farming, further. 
Table 3 shows the effect of the change in insurance premium rate on the entry and 
exit decision.  For example, as the insurance premium rate with 60% coverage level 
increases from 6.3% to 30%, the entry threshold increases from $10,520 to $11,030 and 
the exit threshold increases from $4,536 to $4,882.  In both coverage levels, as the 
insurance premium increases, the entry and exit thresholds increase.  Thus the higher 
insurance premium discourages the investment and current farming operation.  
On the other hand, table 3 shows the effect of insurance premium subsidy on the 
entry and exit thresholds.  As the insurance premium subsidy increases, the premium rate 
to be paid by the farmer decreases.  Thus the insurance premium subsidy decreases the 




This study determines the entry and exit thresholds of table grape farming with 
irreversible investment under uncertainty in California.  The real option approach is 
adopted to consider the investment and management flexibility.  Also revenue insurance 
  17is introduced to consider the effect of the risk management programs on the entry and 
exit thresholds.   
The results show that the entry threshold with real option approach is higher than 
that with the traditional NPV approach and the exit threshold with real option approach is 
lower than that with the traditional NPV approach.  This is a standard result in the real 
options literature.  From the perspective of an application to table grape production, 
uncertainty in future returns in this industry tends to discourage investment by the 
inactive farmer and encourages the active farmer to stay in farming.   
Revenue insurance increases the entry and exit thresholds compared with no 
revenue insurance, provided the revenue guarantee is less than the exit threshold.  In this 
case, revenue insurance discourages both the investment and the current farming 
operation.  Revenue insurance increases the entry threshold and decreases the exit 
threshold as long as the revenue guarantee is greater than the exit threshold.  In this case, 
revenue insurance discourages the investment and encourages the active farmer to stay in 
farming.   
Insurance premium subsidy decreases the variable costs, thus decreasing both the 
entry and exit thresholds.  So the insurance premium subsidy encourages the investment 
and current farming operation. 
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  20Table 1. Parameters used for table grape farming without crop insurance in Texas. 
Parameters Parameter  Values 
Investment Cost ($/acre)  18,638
Variable Cost ($/acre)    
   No Insurance  5,559
   60% Coverage Insurance  5,654
   75% Coverage Insurance  5,781
Expected Revenue ($/acre)  7,000
Guaranteed Revenue ($/acre)   
   60% Coverage Insurance  4,200
   75% Coverage Insurance  5,250
Insurance Premium Rate (%)*   
   60% Coverage Insurance  6.3
   75% Coverage Insurance  9.4
Producer Premium Rate (%)*   
   60% Coverage Insurance  36.0
   75% Coverage Insurance  45.0
Drift Rate   
   Yield  0.001
   Price  0.054
   Revenue  0.002
Volatility (variance) Rate   
   Yield  0.020
   Price  0.040
   Revenue  0.028
Correlation -0.58
Beta  
   Positive  2.186
   Negative  -2.614
Risk Adjusted Rate  0.08
Risk Free Rate  0.07
Rate of Return Shortfall  0.06
* includes the insurance premium subsidy   
  21Table 2. The change in the entry and exit thresholds by parameters 
   Parameters  NPV ($)  Real Options ($) 
      Entry  Exit  Entry  Exit 
        
Variable Cost       5,059        5,455        4,336        9,666        3,943  
       5,559        5,883        4,765       10,390        4,371  
       6,059        6,312        5,193       11,100        4,804  
                   
Investment Cost      16,638        5,763        4,765       10,120        4,419  
      18,638        5,883        4,765       10,390        4,371  
       20,638        6,003        4,765       10,640        4,328  
              
Risk Adjusted Rate  0.07       4,903        3,971        9,209        3,741  
  0.08       5,883        4,765       10,390        4,371  
  0.09       6,864        5,559       11,550        5,010  
                  
Drift Rate  0.01       6,864        5,559       10,650        4,519  
  0.02       5,883        4,765       10,390        4,371  
   0.03       4,903        3,971       10,140        4,221  
              
Volatility Rate  0.018       5,883        4,765        9,775        4,539  
  0.028       5,883        4,765       10,390        4,371  
   0.038       5,883        4,765       10,890        4,241  
  22Table 3. The entry and exit thresholds by insurance premium rate 
   Premium NPV ($)  Real Option ($) 
   Rate (%)  Entry  Exit  Entry  (%)  Exit  (%) 
No Insurance    5,883  4,765  10,390    4,371   
Insurance              
   60% Coverage Level  6.3        5,965        4,846  10,520  (1.01)  4,536  (1.04) 
  20        6,142        5,024  10,810  (1.04)  4,742  (1.08) 
  30        6,272        5,154  11,030  (1.06)  4,882  (1.12) 
   75% Coverage Level  9.4        6,073        4,955  10,660  (1.03)  3,813  (0.87) 
  20        6,289        5,170  11,050  (1.06)  4,391  (1.00) 
   30        6,491        5,373  11,390  (1.10)  4,812  (1.10) 
(  ): Ratio of the entry and exit thresholds calculated based on no insurance    
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